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INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina General Assembly recently passed a hotly
debated bill that reformed medical malpractice liability in several
ways.' Although this legislation received much attention because it
placed a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits,2
another provision also drastically alters current medical malpractice
law in North Carolina. The General Assembly gave emergency health
care providers further protection from liability by raising the burden
of persuasion from the normal "preponderance of the evidence"
standard to the "clear and convincing" standard for plaintiffs with
claims arising out of emergency treatment.' The General Assembly
seemingly intended only to grant this heightened liability protection
to health care providers working in hospital emergency rooms.
Drafters of the bill included limiting language tying the heightened
protection directly to a patient's location in a hospital emergency
room in all earlier drafts of the bill.' However, the final enacted
version does not include language limiting the protection solely to
emergency room providers.'
This Recent Development posits that by omitting the limitation
based on a patient's location in a hospital emergency room, the
General Assembly inadvertently or unwisely extended the heightened
protection intended solely for emergency room health care providers
to providers in a myriad of other contexts.8 In effect, the enacted
language raises the evidentiary standard for plaintiffs bringing claims
against any health care provider in any location, as long as the
individual was treated for an "emergency medical condition" as that
* @ 2013 Elizabeth Hill.
1. Act of July 25,2011, ch. 400, § 6,2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-21.12 (2011)).
2. See Phillip Bantz, Medical Malpractice Actions Continue to Fall, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., Sept. 12, 2011, at 3; see also Act of July 25, 2011, § 7 (capping noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice suits).
3. See Act of July 25, 2011, § 6.
4. See discussion infra Part I.A.
5. See discussion infra Part L.A
6. See Act of July 25, 2011, § 6.
7. See discussion infra Part. LA, B.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
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term is defined under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act ("EMTALA").9 Specifically, this protection may now
extend to treatment of emergencies in local doctors' offices, in
hospitals without emergency rooms, and even in situations occurring
completely outside of a treatment facility where a health care
provider intervenes to render emergency aid.'o Further, because the
new statute defers to EMTALA's definition of "emergency medical
condition," which includes active labor cases where a pregnant
woman is close to the time of her delivery, the General Assembly has
changed the field of obstetrics malpractice by raising the burden of
persuasion for many plaintiffs with claims arising out of normal
childbirth."
This Recent Development urges the General Assembly to amend
the statute's language so it provides protection solely to emergency
room health care providers treating emergency medical conditions.
To do so, the General Assembly should reincorporate the explicit
limitation, found in versions four and five of the bill, that the
protection applies only to claims resulting from the "furnishing or the
failure to furnish professional services in a hospital emergency
room." 2 Without this limitation, the legislation places an
unwarranted evidentiary burden on plaintiffs seeking recovery for
injuries incurred through the negligence of heath care providers
outside of emergency rooms.
This analysis will proceed in four parts. Part I sorts through the
inner workings of the amended malpractice statute in North Carolina
by explaining the transformation of the bill from the original filed
version to the final enacted version, the apparent legislative intent
behind the bill, and the overly broad wording of the newly amended
malpractice statute. Next, Part II explains how the amended statute
works when applied, and how Senate Bill 33 altered the plaintiff's
burden of persuasion, but did not change the mental state that must
be proven. Following the first two sections' discussion of the statute
itself, Part III then explores the consequences of deferring to
EMTALA's definition of "emergency medical condition" without
also including a limitation that the patient was being treated in a
hospital emergency room. Specifically, this Part explains how this
9. See Act of July 25, 2011, § 6; discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part I.A, B.
11. See discussion infra Part III.C.
12. S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 20, 2011) (emphasis
added); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 19, 2011) (emphasis
added).
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change may lead to heightened protection for providers working in
non-hospital treatment facilities, in hospitals without emergency
departments, in situations occurring outside of treatment facilities
(such as in Good Samaritan and other emergency response
situations), and in obstetrics suites and other child delivery cases.
Lastly, Part IV recommends how the General Assembly should alter
the statute's language in order for the heightened protection to only
apply to treatment rendered (or failing to be rendered) in hospital
emergency rooms.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History and Intent of Senate Bill 33
The legislative history of Senate Bill 33 strongly suggests that the
General Assembly intended-at least up until the time of the final
drafting stage of the bill-to only protect emergency health care
providers when furnishing treatment in hospital emergency rooms,
rather than protecting all health care providers in any situation they
may find themselves providing emergency treatment. 3 In fact, all of
the previous versions of Senate Bill 33 limited the protection to
hospital emergency room treatment. Both the original filed version of
13. See N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 20, 2011) ("In any medical malpractice action arising
out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional services in a hospital emergency
room, the claimant must prove a violation of the standard of health care set forth in
subsection (a) of this section by clear and convincing evidence."); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft,
Apr. 19, 2011) ("In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing or the
failure to furnish professional services in a hospital emergency room. ); S.B. 33, 2011
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Mar. 2, 2011) ("In any medical malpractice action
arising out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish services pursuant to obligations
imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd [EMTALA] for an emergency medical condition as
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)...."); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft,
N.C. Mar. 1, 2011) ("In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing or the
failure to furnish services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
[EMTALA] for an emergency medical condition as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)
...); N.C Senate OKs Malpractice Reform, WRAL (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/story/9205313/ ("Supporters say the change is
needed because federal law doesn't let emergency room doctors choose their patients.
They're required to treat anyone who needs help, no matter how difficult the case or how
many other patients they're treating at the time. That makes emergency medicine a riskier
specialty than other areas of practice."). Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee, in
analyzing and summarizing an earlier version of the bill, labeled the section of this
committee report that discussed the reforms to emergency health care as "Emergency
Services Required to be Provided by Federal Law." S. JUDICIARY I COMM., SENATE PCS
33: MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORMS, S. 2011-33, Reg. Sess., at 1 (2011) [hereinafter
LIABILITY REFORMS] (emphasis added). However, such services are only required under
federal law in hospital emergency rooms, as discussed in the text accompanying infra note
19.
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Senate Bill 33 and the first edited version stated that the heightened
protection was to apply "[in any medical malpractice action arising
out of the provision of emergency services as defined in G.S. 58-3-
190(g)(2)." 14 Under the referenced North Carolina statute,
"emergency services" includes the screening and treatment of
emergency medical conditions in a hospital emergency department. 5
Thus, these two versions of the bill-the original filed version and
first edited version-tied the protection directly to treatment in
hospital emergency departments.16
Edited versions two and three of the bill continued to limit the
protection only to hospital emergency room providers, but did so in a
different way than the first two versions. The second and third edited
versions provided that the protection applied "[i]n any medical
malpractice action arising out of the furnishing or the failure to
furnish services pursuant to obligations imposed by [EMTALA] for
an emergency medical condition as defined in [EMTALA].""'
EMTALA does not apply to all treatment facilities, but rather it
applies only to "participating hospitals"-those hospitals that receive
certain federal funding and have an "emergency department."18
Therefore, these versions of the bill that limited the protection to
those providers required to treat under EMTALA inherently
included the limitation that the protection only extended to
emergency department providers since they are the only providers
with such an obligation. 19
Lastly, versions four and five of the bill stated that the
14. S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Feb. 3, 2011); S.B. 33, 2011
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Feb. 2, 2011).
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-190(g)(2) (2011). This statute also includes
"prehospital care and ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department,"
id., but this Recent Development will not address the detailed nuances of when treatment
services are considered to be "prehospital care" or ancillary to the emergency department.
16. See id.; N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Feb. 3,2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Feb. 2,2011).
17. N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Mar. 2, 2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Mar. 1, 2011).
18. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
(2006) ("In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any
individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the
emergency department .... "); Medero Diaz v. Grupo De Empresas De Salud, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 222, 225 (D.P.R. 2000) ("A participating hospital is one that has executed a
Medicare provider agreement with the federal government." (citations omitted)).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). There has been much controversy in the federal courts
as to what it means that a patient has arrived at an emergency department, but what does
and does not count as being in the emergency room is beyond the scope of this Recent
Development. It is enough for this Recent Development's purposes to note that
EMTALA duties only arise once a person arrives at the emergency department, see id.,
without getting into the nuances of what counts as having arrived there.
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heightened protection applied "[i]n any medical malpractice action
arising out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish professional
services in a hospital emergency room." 20 Thus, these two versions
most clearly tied the protection to a patient's location in a hospital
emergency room, but they left out the requirement that the patient
must be suffering from an emergency medical condition, which was a
limitation found in all of the other versions. 2 1 Notwithstanding other
changes made between previous versions of the Senate Bill 33, one
thing remained the same throughout: they all tied the protection to
treatment in hospital emergency rooms.22
In addition to the previous versions of Senate Bill 33, other
legislative history-including committee hearing minutes and
committee bill summaries-suggests that the General Assembly
intended for the protection to apply solely to hospital emergency
providers. Committee meeting discussions were focused on balancing
the concerns for emergency room health care providers with the
concerns for the victims of emergency room medical malpractice.2 3
One set of Senate committee meeting minutes captured Senator
Nesbitt's concerns, noting, "Seems that this bill will take away the
negligence standard in the emergency rooms.... We are trying to
give people in emergency situations a little bit of slack, but not
absolute immunity."24 The record also summarized Senator Brown's
position, stating that "the ER is a very special situation," and stating
his belief "that those guys deserve some special protections."2 s The
minutes from another committee meeting detailed Senator Stein's
statement, noting that he "[could] only imagine how stressful it is to
be an ER doc[tor] and wantfed] to recognize the unique challenges
that they face."' In addition, a committee summary of one of the
bill's earlier versions affirmed that the language had been
20. S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 20, 2011); S.B. 33, 2011
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 19,2011).
21. See N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 20, 2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 19, 2011).
22. See N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 20, 2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 19, 2011); N.C.
S.B. 33 (Draft, Mar. 2, 2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Mar. 1, 2011); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Feb. 3, 2011); S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Draft, N.C. Feb. 2, 2011).
23. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary I Committee Feb. 24, 2011 Minutes, 2011 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 24 Minutes]; Senate Judiciary I Committee Feb. 22,
2011 Minutes, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 22 Minutes];
Senate Judiciary I Committee Feb. 17, 2011 Minutes, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2011) [hereinafter Feb. 17 Minutes].
24. Feb. 24 Minutes, supra note 23, at 1 (statement of Sen. Nesbitt).
25. Id. (statement of Sen. Brown).
26. Feb. 22 Minutes, supra note 23, at 1 (statement of Sen. Stein).
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intentionally altered to limit the application of the heightened
protection "to malpractice actions arising out of emergency services
required to be provided under EMTALA,"2 7 which, as previously
mentioned, are only required in hospital emergency departments. 28
An examination of who the lobbying organizations were, as well
as what the opponents of the bill were concerned about, further
evidences that the focus all along was on emergency room care. For
example, the North Carolina College of Emergency Physicians fought
for Senate Bill 33 to be passed." That organization is the North
Carolina chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians
and is comprised of over 800 members practicing or studying
emergency medicine in North Carolina. 0 On the other side of the
debate, opponents of the bill included groups like North Carolina
Advocates for Justice, who submitted a report to the General
Assembly discussing the effects the bill would have on victims of
malpractice in hospital emergency rooms and compiling letters from
concerned citizens who were upset over the bill." These constituent
letters similarly focused on the effects this bill would have on
emergency room malpractice victims, many telling personal stories of
their own tragic experiences in a hospital emergency room.32
Overall, the record suggests that both the General Assembly and
the public thought they were dealing with a provision that was going
to give heightened protection to emergency room providers. Whether
the General Assembly had a last minute change of heart and
27. LIABILITY REFORMS, supra note 13, at 2.
28. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
(2006).
29. See Feb. 17 Minutes, supra note 23, at 3 (statement of Greg Cannon,
Secretary/Treasurer of North Carolina College of Emergency Physicians); Frank Smeeks,
Legislature Overrides SB33 Veto, N.C. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS (July 26, 2011),
http://www.acepchapters.org/nc/News/LatestNews.aspx.
30. About Us, N.C. C. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS,
http://www.acepchapters.org/n/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) ("The North
Carolina College of Emergency Physicians ("NCCEP") is a chartered chapter of the
American College of Emergency Physicians. NCCEP is a diverse group of practicing
emergency physicians, including academicians, private practice physicians, large groups,
small groups, individual physicians, board certified, non-board certified, rural, urban,
residents, and medical students.").
31. For a report included in the submitted compilation of materials, see N.C.
ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE, SB 33: AN ATTACK ON VULNERABLE PATIENTS 1 (2011).
32. See, e.g., Letter from Renee Hazelton to Bob Rucho, State Senator, N.C. Gen.
Assembly (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Legislative Library and the
author) ("Liam's pediatrician told me to take him to the emergency department, so I did.
Despite my concerns, the ER doctor gave him only a very cursory exam .. .. As a result of
the emergency doctor's negligence, my 16 month old son suffered a severe stroke. .. ").
2013] 725
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purposefully extended the protection to other providers, or whether
the change in the statute's scope was inadvertent, the newly amended
malpractice statute has potentially far-reaching consequences outside
of just hospital emergency rooms.
B. The Language of North Carolina's Newly Amended Malpractice
Statute
The enacted version of Senate Bill 33 provides that,
[i]n any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing
or the failure to furnish professional services in the treatment of
an emergency medical condition, as the term "emergency
medical condition" is defined in 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(e)(1)
[EMTALA], the claimant must prove a violation of the
standards of practice set forth in subsection (a) of this section
by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, the enacted version of the bill includes the limitation that the
protection only applies for the treatment of an "emergency medical
condition," but unlike all of the previous versions of the bill, the
enacted version does not limit the heightened protection to a patient's
location in a hospital emergency room. 4 It appears that in editing the
final version, legislators intended to fix the language of versions four
and five, which had left out the limitation that the protection only
applied to treatment of an "emergency medical condition."3 The
General Assembly included the limitation based on the patient's
physical condition in all other versions of the bill,36 and the limitation
was obviously thought important by the legislature, as they
purposefully added it back into the final version after deleting it in
versions four and five." In making this final edit on the bill, the
legislators were potentially trying to reincorporate the limitation
based on the patient's medical condition ("emergency medical
condition"), but, in doing so, inadvertently left out the second
limitation based on the patient's location in a hospital emergency
room. The emergency room location limitation, present in all
previous drafts, had been the focus of the discussion all along. 8
33. Act of July 25, 2011, § 6, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1712, 1715 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT, § 90-21.12(b) (2011)).
34. See id.
35. See S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 20, 2011); S.B. 33,
2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 19, 2011).
36. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
37. See Act of July 25,2011, § 6.
38. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Regardless, whether the omission was intentional or inadvertent,
removing the location limitation will cause serious and far-reaching
consequences for medical malpractice litigation in North Carolina
that were not discussed by the General Assembly in passing the bill3 9
Although the statute fails to include the location limitation, it
does place one limit on the outer bounds of the heightened
protection-the patient's medical condition. 40 The heightened
protection only applies to claims "arising out of ... the treatment of
an 'emergency medical condition,' " as defined under federal law in
EMTALA.4 1 EMTALA defines "emergency medical condition" as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected
to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a
pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn
child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having
contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to
another hospital before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of
the woman or the unborn child.42
Accordingly, under the new provision, anytime a health care provider
treats or fails to treat a person in a condition that falls into one of
these categories set out in EMTALA, she will have heightened
protection from liability if the individual later sues for malpractice.43
39. See discussion infra Part III.
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12(b) (2011).
41. Id. For a discussion of EMTALA and its history, see generally Lynn Healey
Scaduto, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act Gone Astray: A
Proposal to Reclaim EMTALA for Its Intended Beneficiaries, 46 UCLA L REV. 943
(1999).
42. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(1) (2006).
43. See § 90-21.12(b).
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II. THE NEW STATUTE IN ACTION
A. Heightened Burden of Persuasion
Although the muddied wording of the new medical malpractice
statute makes it unclear as to which claims it will apply, it explicitly
lays out what happens once a court determines that the statute does
in fact apply to a particular malpractice claim-the plaintiff will face a
heightened burden of persuasion." A plaintiff's burden of persuasion
defines the amount of evidentiary support required to convince a fact-
finder to decide the case in her favor.' Rather than keeping with the
typical "preponderance of the evidence" standard imposed in other
medical malpractice actions,4 the statute now provides that plaintiffs
with claims resulting from the treatment of emergency medical
conditions will have to prove their cases by "clear and convincing
evidence." 7 This heightened protection from liability covers not just
doctors, but all health care providers, including nurses and many
other individuals rendering health care services in a number of
medical fields. 8
B. Mental State Requirement
Although plaintiffs treated for an emergency medical condition
now face a heightened evidentiary standard, the mental state that the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant provider possessed remains
the same as for all medical malpractice claims-medical negligence.49
44. See id.
45. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a party's burden of
persuasion as "[a] party's duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that
favors that party").
46. See § 90-21.12(a).
47. Id. § 90-21.12(b); see also In re Smith, 146 N.C. App. 302, 304, 552 S.E.2d 184, 186
(2001) ("Clear and convincing evidence 'is greater than the preponderance of the evidence
standard required in most civil cases.'" (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109-10,
316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984)).
48. See § 90-21.11(1)(a) (defining "[h]ealth care provider" to include "[a] person who
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes is licensed, or is
otherwise registered or certified to engage in the practice of or otherwise performs duties
associated with any of the following: medicine, surgery, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry,
midwifery, osteopathy, podiatry, chiropractic, radiology, nursing, physiotherapy,
pathology, anesthesiology, anesthesia, laboratory analysis, rendering assistance to a
physician, dental hygiene, psychiatry, or psychology"); id. § 90-21.11(2) (defining
"[m]edical malpractice action," in part, as "[a] civil action for damages for personal injury
or death arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish professional services in the
performance of medical, dental, or other health care by a health care provider"); id. § 90-
21.12(b) (applying the heightened standard to medical malpractice actions arising from
emergency treatment).
49. See § 90-21.12.
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In proving a typical medical malpractice claim, plaintiffs must show
that the defendant health care provider's mental state reached the
level of medical negligence at the time of the alleged malpractice, and
must do so by showing that the provider breached his statutory duty
of care.so In North Carolina, the duty of care statute states that
the care of such health care provider [must not have been] in
accordance with the standards of practice among members of
the same health care profession with similar training and
experience situated in the same or similar communities under
the same or similar circumstances at the time of the alleged act
giving rise to the cause of action."
The original draft of Senate Bill 33 protected emergency room
providers by raising the mental state requirement so that doctors
providing treatment of an emergency condition would only be found
liable if their behavior deviated so far from the standard of care as to
be considered grossly negligent." To do so would mean that North
Carolina emergency room providers would no longer be liable for
carelessly and unintentionally providing inadequate care to patients.53
Rather, to be liable for gross negligence, providers would have to
"conscious[ly] disregard. . . the safety" of their patients, knowing that
their actions were harmful, but purposefully performing them
anyway.54 As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has noted, "[T]he
difference between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is
substantial."" Thus, it follows that plaintiffs would have a much
harder time proving that a health care provider's actions reached the
level of gross negligence than if they only had to prove regular
medical malpractice.56 As one doctor explained the effect of a gross
50. See id. § 90-21.12(a).
51. Id.
52. See S.B. 33,2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Feb. 2, 2011).
53. For a discussion of North Carolina's "same or similar community" standard for
medical malpractice actions, which takes into account the provider's particular medical
community in determining whether he is liable, see generally Casey Hyman, Comment,
Setting the "Bar" in North Carolina Medical Malpractice Litigation: Working with the
Standard of Care that Everyone Loves to Hate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 234, 244-46 (2010).
54. Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 53, 550 S.E.2d 155, 158 (2001) ("Thus, the difference
between [regular negligence and gross negligence] is not in degree or magnitude of
inadvertence or carelessness, but rather is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
misconduct affecting the safety of others. An act or conduct rises to the level of gross
negligence when the act is done purposely and with knowledge that such act is a breach of
duty to others, i.e., a conscious disregard of the safety of others. An act or conduct moves
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negligence standard, "It[ ] [would] be impossible for any patient to
ever sue a physician in the emergency department . ... The physician
would literally have to show up for their shift drunk out of their
mind."' Because of this extreme difficulty that injured plaintiffs
would face in successfully bringing suits if emergency doctors were
only held to a gross negligence standard, the original draft of Senate
Bill 33 faced much opposition from North Carolina citizens," as well
as from advocacy groups, such as the North Carolina Advocates for
Justice. 9
After the original draft received this opposition for its gross
negligence standard, the General Assembly chose to refrain from
altering the mental state requirement."o Instead, as discussed above,
legislators heightened the evidentiary standard, which means
plaintiffs will still face a higher evidentiary standard if treated for an
emergency medical condition," but they will not have to prove the
provider was grossly negligent. Under the enacted language now in
place, emergency care providers will still be liable for acts constituting
regular medical negligence, rather than only those constituting at
least gross negligence, but plaintiffs will have to prove the
commission of such medical negligence by clear and convincing
evidence.62
III. CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING OUT THE LIMITATION BASED ON
A PATIENT'S LOCATION IN AN EMERGENCY RooM
In North Carolina, plaintiffs who bring claims arising out of
treatment for an emergency medical condition will now face the
additional challenge of having to prove their case by clear and
convincing evidence because North Carolina's new statute does not
tie the heightened protection to a patient being in a hospital
emergency room.63 Thus, North Carolina's new tort reform has
granted heightened protection not only to emergency room providers,
but also to providers who are treating patients 1) in non-hospital
57. Travis Fain, Negligence, Cap on Damages, Focus of Malpractice Reform Bill,
INDEP. WKLY. (Durham), Mar. 23, 2011, (News), at 9 (quoting Dr. John Faulkner)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
58. See, e.g., supra note 32.
59. See, e.g., N.C. ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 2; see also N.C.
ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 33 - MEDICAL LIABILITY
REFORMS (2011) (critiquing S.B. 33 section by section).
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12(b) (2011).
61. See discussion supra Part II.A.
62. See § 90-21.12.
63. See id. § 90-21.12(b).
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treatment facilities, as well as in hospitals that do not have an
emergency department; 2) outside of treatment facilities-such as in
Good Samaritan or Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") response
situations; and 3) in many childbirth situations occurring outside of
the emergency room.
A. Treatment Facilities Outside of Hospital Emergency Rooms
A potential consequence of the new statute is that patients who
are treated in non-emergency treatment facilities with no emergency
health care providers on staff may also face this heightened burden,
as long as the treatment was for an "emergency medical condition."
Previous versions of the bill excluded from their protection those
providers working in hospitals without emergency departments, as
well as those working in non-hospital treatment facilities, by either
explicitly linking the protection to hospital emergency rooms or by
linking it to treatment obligations imposed by EMTALA.6 5
EMTALA does not impose any treatment obligations on hospitals
without emergency departments nor on non-hospital treatment
facilities, such as local doctors' offices.' However, since the amended
statute lacks a location limitation,' whenever a patient is treated in a
non-emergency treatment facility for symptoms "that could
reasonably be expected" to lead to serious impairment
notwithstanding medical treatment,' the patient will now face a
heightened evidentiary standard under the plain meaning of the
statute.69
The following example best illustrates the negative consequences
of failing to tie the heightened evidentiary standard to a patient's
location in a hospital emergency room: Suppose a patient goes into
his local family doctor's office for a common cold and while there
suffers a heart attack. Under the definition of "emergency medical
condition" found in EMTALA, a heart attack would certainly qualify
as a condition that "could reasonably be expected" to result in serious
health impairments for the patient." Under the plain language of the
new statute, if the local family doctor then attempts to provide
64. See id.
65. See discussion supra Part L.A.
66, See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
(2006).
67. See § 90-21.12(b).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
69. See § 90-21.12(b).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
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treatment to the patient for the heart attack, she will fall within the
heightened protection because she would be "furnish[ing]
professional services in the treatment of an emergency medical
condition."71 Therefore, if the patient later brings a medical
malpractice claim against the local doctor for treatment of the heart
attack, he will have to prove his case by clear and convincing
evidence.72 The doctor will already have one level of protection
against the claim because, as mentioned above, North Carolina's
statutory standard of care already takes into account the doctor's
level of training and specific circumstances of the incident. 7 Even
without the new protection, this doctor would only be held to the
standard of other local family doctors lacking emergency room
expertise and treating a heart attack patient in a regular doctor's
office with limited emergency resources at hand.74 If the doctor fails
to meet this fairly subjective standard, then she would have been by
definition medically negligent, and malpractice would have
occurred.
The new heightened evidentiary standard, with no limitation
based on patient location, adds an additional burden for this plaintiff:
the plaintiff must still establish that the doctor failed to meet the
standard for treating a heart attack in the same way other local family
doctors with little emergency training and few resources would treat
it,76 but he will now have to prove this already difficult claim by clear
and convincing evidence. The fact that the legislators did not discuss
this result when debating Senate Bill 33 suggests that the General
Assembly did not fully contemplate the wide reaching effects of
leaving out the patient-limiting language.
B. Good Samaritan and Other Volunteer Emergency Response
Situations
The language of North Carolina's new medical malpractice
statute also encompasses many "Good Samaritan" situations where
doctors, nurses, or other health care providers simply happen upon an
emergency-stopping on the side of the road to aid in an accident or
71. See § 90-21.12(b).
72. See id.




77. See id. § 90-21.12(b).
78. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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rushing to the aid of a fellow passenger on a plane or patron in a
movie theater-as well as more coordinated response efforts, such as
those of EMS providers.79 Because the statute as currently worded
applies to the treatment of an "emergency medical condition"
without any requirement that the treatment be in a hospital
emergency room, it follows that the heightened protection would
apply to treatment of emergency conditions by Good Samaritans or
EMS providers, even though such treatment occurs outside of the
emergency room. 0 However, whether or not the new heightened
protection will in fact extend to such situations will depend on
whether or not the services rendered by these providers are
considered "professional services.""
As previously discussed, the heightened protection only applies
in medical malpractice actions, and medical malpractice actions may
only be brought if the treatment arose out of "professional
services."a In addition, the new provision specifically providing
protection for emergency treatment also limits the protection to
claims "arising out of the furnishing or the failure to furnish
professional services."' Accordingly, the new heightened protection
will only apply to emergency services rendered outside of a treatment
facility if the following two criteria are met: 1) the services rendered
are considered "professional services" by the court; and 2) they were
rendered for an "emergency medical condition."'
Under North Carolina law, "[a] 'professional' act or service is
one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment
involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor or skill
involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical
or manual."" For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
considered the decision to put restraints on a patient to be "a medical
decision requiring clinical judgment and intellectual skill [and was
thus] a professional service,""8 while "the removal of [a patient] from
79. See § 90-21.12(b).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. § 90-21.11(2) (defining "medical malpractice" as "[a] civil action for
damages for personal injury or death arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish
professional services in the performance of medical, dental, or other health care by a
health care provider").
83. See id. § 90-21.12(b).
84. See id.
85. Smith v. Keator, 21 N.C. App. 102, 105-06, 203 S.E.2d 411, 415 (citation omitted),
affd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974).
86. Sturgill v. Ashe Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 186 N.C. App. 624, 630, 652 S.E.2d 302, 306
(2007) (citing Smith, 21 N.C. App. at 105-06,203 S.E.2d at 415).
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[an] examination table to [a] wheelchair did not involve an
occupation involving specialized knowledge or skill, as it was
predominately a physical or manual activity" and thus did "not fall
into the realm of professional medical services."" In deciding
whether or not a particular act constitutes the rendering of
professional services, North Carolina courts focus on whether it was a
physical act that could be done just as well by a layperson."
The fact-based determination as to whether a Good Samaritan or
other emergency service provider rendered "professional services"
can be illustrated by the following examples. A Good Samaritan who
happens upon a car accident or an EMS provider who responds to a
911 call would arguably avoid medical malpractice liability for injuries
caused by removing a person from a burning car simply because it
was merely a physical act that could be done just as well by a
layperson and requires no advanced medical knowledge." However,
that same health care provider most likely could be subject to medical
malpractice liability for administering prescription drugs at the scene
of the accident since that requires "specialized instruction and
study." 90
Accordingly, the fact that the new heightened protection will
apply to at least some Good Samaritan and emergency response
situations (dependent on whether professional services were
rendered) further bolsters this Recent Development's argument that
the new protection extends too broadly and should be explicitly
limited to hospital emergency rooms. The General Assembly already
granted Good Samaritan and other volunteer emergency service
providers immunity from all regular negligence claims through two
previous enactments. First, in North Carolina, individuals who act as
Good Samaritans and aid at the scene of a car accident are already
protected from liability by a heightened mental state requirement:
Good Samaritans aiding at the scene of a car accident may not be
held liable for mere negligence, but rather, must be found at least
87. Lewis v. Setty, 130 N.C. App. 606,608, 503 S.E.2d 673, 674 (1998).
88. Compare Smith, 21 N.C. App. at 106,203 S.E.2d at 415 ("Administering a massage
requires manual skill and dexterity, but it does not require mental or intellectual skill,
advanced knowledge, or specialized instruction and study. An uneducated person can give
a massage as well as an educated person."), and Lewis, 130 N.C. App. at 608, 503 S.E.2d at
674 (holding that placing a patient in a wheelchair was a physical activity requiring no
advanced skills and thus not a professional service), with Stugill, 186 N.C. App. at 630, 653
S.E.2d at 306 (finding the decision to restrain a patient to be a professional service because
it required specialized knowledge or skill).
89. See Lewis, 130 N.C. App. at 608,503 S.E.2d at 674.
90. See Smith, 21 N.C. App. at 106,203 S.E.2d at 415.
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grossly negligent.9 1 Therefore, under the new medical malpractice
statute, if a doctor or a nurse happens to be the first on the scene of
an accident and renders emergency care as a Good Samaritan, they
may be shielded by two layers of protection: they will only be liable if
they are at least grossly negligent, rather than merely negligent,9 and
plaintiffs may have to prove the provider's gross negligence by clear
and convincing evidence.93 Second, the General Assembly also
extended immunity from regular negligence claims in two other ways
through a separate enactment: 1) the statute granted such protection
to all volunteer medical providers, including EMS personnel who do
not just happen upon the scene of an emergency, as is the case in the
more typical Good Samaritan situations; and 2) the statute extended
the immunity to volunteer treatment of any emergency situation
falling within the statute's definition, rather than solely treatment at
car accident scenes to which the first Good Samaritan statute
discussed is limited.94
The amended statute's double-layered protection for volunteer
emergency providers appears unintentional. The General Assembly
already carefully considered how best to provide protection to Good
Samaritans and other volunteer emergency service providers, and
chose to do so explicitly through an elevated mental state
requirement rather than a heightened burden of persuasion.' In fact,
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (2011) ("Any person who renders first aid or
emergency assistance at the scene of a motor vehicle crash on any street or highway to any
person injured as a result of the accident, shall not be liable in civil damages for any acts or
omissions relating to the services rendered, unless the acts or omissions amount to wanton
conduct or intentional wrongdoing.").
92. See id.
93. See id. § 90-21.12(b).
94. See id. § 90-21.14(a) ("Any person, including a volunteer medical or health care
provider at a facility of a local health department as defined in G.S. 130A-2 or at a
nonprofit community health center or a volunteer member of a rescue squad, who receives
no compensation for his services as an emergency medical care provider, who renders first
aid or emergency health care treatment to a person who is unconscious, ill or injured, (1)
[w]hen the reasonably apparent circumstances require prompt decisions and actions in
medical or other health care, and (2) [w]hen the necessity of immediate health care
treatment is so reasonably apparent that any delay in the rendering of the treatment would
seriously worsen the physical condition or endanger the life of the person, shall not be
liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the person or for
damages for the death of the person alleged to have occurred by reason of an act or
omission in the rendering of the treatment unless it is established that the injuries were or
the death was caused by gross negligence, wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing on
the part of the person rendering the treatment. The immunity conferred in this section
also applies to any person who uses an automated external defibrillator (AED) and
otherwise meets the requirements of this section.").
95. See id. §§ 20-166, 90-21.14(a).
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one Senate committee report summarizing an earlier draft of Senate
Bill 33 explicitly discussed this issue, stating that, "under current law,
providers of emergency medical care who are compensated for their
services are subject to liability in malpractice actions under the
general standard of care," while noting that, in contrast, voluntary
providers must be at least grossly negligent to be liable. After noting
this distinction, the report went on to provide that Senate Bill 33 had
been altered so that heightened protection would also extend to
compensated providers who have a duty to treat under EMTALA"
(which only arises in emergency departments)." This report supports
the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend for the new
heightened evidentiary standard to apply to claims arising out of
treatment by voluntary health care providers, as legislators explicitly
recognized that those providers were already protected under North
Carolina law.99
C. Active Labor During Childbirth
Yet another consequence, and arguably the most serious, is the
amended statute's effect on obstetrics malpractice claims. The plain
language of the statute now encompasses many claims arising out of
normal childbirth. This unfortunate result is due to the provision's
deferral to EMTALA's definition of "emergency medical condition,"
which includes certain active labor cases, 00 without also including a
limitation based on the patient's location in an emergency
department.' 0' Under EMTALA, a woman is considered to be in an
"emergency medical condition" if she is having contractions and
"there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or [if] transfer may pose a threat to the health or
safety of the woman or the unborn child."102 Thus, because North
Carolina's new statute defers to this same definition, a woman will
now be considered to be in an "emergency medical condition" once
she is in active labor and there would not be enough time to get her to
a different hospital before delivery, or such transfer would be
96. See LIABILITY REFORMS, supra note 13, at 2.
97. See id.
98. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
(2006).
99. See LIABILITY REFORMS, supra note 13, at 2.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B).
101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12(b) (2011).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B).
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Courts may face difficulty in deciding whether the new
heightened protection applies to obstetrics malpractice claims
because, if they attempt to apply the literal language of the statute,
they will have to determine, hypothetically, whether a patient could
have been safely transferred, even though the doctor may have never
contemplated transferring the patient.'" This absurdity in the new
provision's application results from the fact that EMTALA's purpose
is to prevent emergency room facilities from turning away patients in
true emergency situations and to thwart health care providers' efforts
to dump patients on other nearby facilities. 0 Thus, EMTALA's
definition of "emergency medical condition," which was enacted to
delineate the situations in which providers may legally turn away or
transfer patients, makes little sense when applied to situations where
providers are trying to treat the active labor patients rather than get
rid of them.106 Due to the unnecessary inquiry resulting from courts
103. See § 90-21.12(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (defining "emergency
medical condition").
104. See § 90-21.12(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (defining "emergency
medical condition"). For a case engaging in this hypothetical inquiry when applying
EMTALA, see Burditt v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1369-70
(5th Cir. 1991) ("Burditt challenges the ALJ's finding that, at approximately 5:00, there
was inadequate time to safely transfer Rivera to John Sealy before she delivered her baby.
Dr. Warren Crosby testified that, based on Burditt's own examination results, Rivera
would, more likely than not, deliver within three hours after Burditt spoke with Downing
at John Sealy. This expert testimony constitutes substantial record evidence to sustain the
ALJ's finding. Burditt does not challenge DAB's conclusion that the ambulance trip from
DeTar to John Sealy takes approximately three hours. We therefore hold that DAB
properly concluded that Rivera was in active labor under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2)(B).").
105. See Trivette v. N.C. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 131 N.C. App. 73, 75, 507 S.E.2d 48, 50
(1998) ("EMTALA imposes these limited duties upon hospitals with emergency rooms
because EMTALA was primarily, if not solely, enacted to deal with the problem of
patients being turned away from emergency rooms for non-medical reasons."), aff'd in
part, 350 N.C. 299,512 S.E.2d 425 (1999).
106. As a result of the statute's deferral to EMTALA's definition of emergency
medical condition, the heightened evidentiary burden will oscillate in child delivery cases
depending solely on the geographic location of other hospitals. For example, a woman
being treated in a rural North Carolina community hospital far from other hospitals may
be penalized with a heightened evidentiary standard much sooner in the childbirth process
than a woman being treated in an urban area. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B).
Hypothetically, assume a woman is at a local community hospital in rural North Carolina
located two hours from the next hospital, and she is progressing through a normal delivery
on the obstetrics floor. Under the definition of "emergency medical condition" in
EMTALA, which North Carolina's new provision defers to, that woman will be
considered to be in an "emergency medical condition" once she could not be transferred
to another hospital before giving birth. See id; see also Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1369-70
(engaging in the hypothetical inquiry when applying EMTALA of whether a patient in
labor could be safely transferred to a different hospital). Thus, because she is two hours
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attempting to apply the literal language of the statute, perhaps they
will instead forgo the hypothetical inquiry and merely hold that a
woman near the time of her delivery is in an emergency medical
condition regardless of the proximity of other hospitals. There is no
telling how courts will choose to analyze the new language until it is
grappled with in an actual active labor case. However, even if courts
choose not to extend the heightened burden to childbirth cases at all,
altering the statute to explicitly limit it to hospital emergency rooms
would make clear a currently muddled framework. 0
As the statute is currently worded, every single woman giving
birth in North Carolina could be considered to be in an "emergency
medical condition" at some point in her delivery progression. 0
Without a link to emergency room treatment, the heightened burden
of persuasion now no longer extends only to true emergency child
delivery cases presenting in a hospital emergency room, but to
delivery claims arising in many other contexts, as well.'" For example,
all women giving birth on an obstetrics floor of a hospital could face
away from the next hospital, she will be considered to be in an "emergency medical
condition" for the entire two hours preceding her child's delivery. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(1)(B). If any alleged malpractice occurs during that two-hour time frame
preceding the birth, she will face the heightened burden of persuasion under the new
statute because during that time she will be receiving treatment for an "emergency
medical condition." See § 90-21.12(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (defining
"emergency medical condition"). In contrast, assume a woman is going through labor at a
hospital in an urban area, which is located only five minutes from the next hospital. She
will not be considered to be in an "emergency medical condition" until she passes the
point in time where she could not get to that next hospital before delivering the baby. See
§ 395dd(e)(1)(B). Thus, she will only be considered to be in an emergency medical
condition for the five minutes preceding her child's birth. See id. Accordingly, she will only
face a heightened burden of persuasion for any claims arising out of those five minutes
prior to delivery. To summarize, the woman in rural North Carolina will face a heightened
burden for any malpractice that occurs the entire two hours before her baby's delivery, but
the woman in urban North Carolina will only face the heightened burden for malpractice
that occurs in those last five minutes before the birth. Thus, the further from other
hospitals the patient is located, the sooner in the birthing process that patient falls under
the new heightened evidentiary standard. This example illustrates the difficulty of
applying EMTALA's definition of "emergency medical condition" to situations where a
doctor is treating, rather than trying to transfer, an active labor patient.
107. One federal district court dealing with an emergency birth situation after the
statute was amended did not discuss the plaintiffs' burden of persuasion, but rather,
merely stated they had met it. See Burk v. United States, No. 5:10-CV-470-H, 2012 WL
1185011, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2012) (applying North Carolina's medical malpractice
statute in an emergency birth situation). Thus, this case sheds no light on how courts may
apply the new statute to child delivery cases. Perhaps this conclusion was due in part to the
court's confusion regarding which evidentiary standard to apply.
108. See § 90-21.12(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (defining "emergency
medical condition").
109. See § 90-21.12(b).
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this heightened burden if malpractice occurs during that window of
time where they are considered to be in an "emergency medical
condition" because they could not hypothetically make it to another
hospital before giving birth.' Further, the new provision arguably
encompasses most, if not all, claims arising out of emergency
Cesarean sections since such procedures are performed under very
serious conditions, such as severe fetal distress or a prolapsed cord."'
Under these types of dire circumstances, delay in the delivery would
be almost certain to cause injury to the mother or child, and thus,
transfer could not be safely executed before birth."2
It seems unlikely that the General Assembly intended to change
the entire field of obstetrics malpractice in such a covert manner,
particularly considering the tragedy associated with many claims
arising out of childbirth." 3 As the United States Supreme Court has
said, Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might
say, hide elephants in mouseholes."l 4 Similarly, it seems hard to
imagine that the North Carolina General Assembly would hide such a
profound change to obstetrics malpractice in a "mousehole" like this
one.
At no point does the legislative history suggest that the General
Assembly intended the new protection to affect claims arising in
normal childbirth cases occurring in obstetrics suites or operating
110. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (defining "emergency medical
condition"). For an example of a court finding under EMTALA that once a woman
reaches the point where she could not be safely transferred to another hospital she is
considered to be in an "emergency medical condition," see Burdit, 934 F.2d at 1369-70.
111. See JOEL M. EVANS & ROBIN ARONSON, THE WHOLE PREGNANCY
HANDBOOK: AN OBSTETRICIAN'S GUIDE TO INTEGRATING CONVENTIONAL AND
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER PREGNANCY 479 (2005).
112. See generally id. (describing complications giving rise to emergency Cesarean
sections and their corresponding dangers).
113. See, e.g., Estate of McCall v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1294 (N.D. Fla.
2009) ("There is no question, as shown by the evidence, that Mr. and Mrs. McCall were
both very close to their daughter and that this tragedy has greatly impacted the quality of
their lives, emotionally as well as physically. They were otherwise healthy, active, and
excited about helping their daughter and new grandson. They went to the hospital with the
happy and hopeful expectation of bringing their daughter home with a healthy baby but
instead found themselves faced with the agonizing decision of whether to remove life
support from her. Mr. McCall struggled as he recounted their hope of Michelle possibly
regaining consciousness as they laid W.W. across her before she died, and also so they
could have one photograph of her 'holding' her baby before she died. The pain from the
loss of their only daughter and the mental agony of having to make the decision to remove
her from life support will not soon abate, if ever in their lifetimes.").
114. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
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rooms, rather than emergency rooms."' Arguably, active labor
patients arriving in the emergency room just moments before birth
would constitute what the average person would consider an
"emergency." However, a delivery proceeding as normal in an
obstetrics suite may now also be an "emergency medical condition" in
North Carolina."' As mentioned above, there is no telling how courts
will choose to apply the statute's new language in the future, but the
mere fact that the language allows an extension to regular childbirth
cases could lead to confusion for courts and potentially disparate
treatment of child delivery malpractice claims depending on different
courts' analyses under this unclear framework.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING THE STATUTE
The General Assembly should amend the statute to
reincorporate its limitation from previous versions of the bill that the
heightened protection only applies to hospital emergency room
providers."' To do this, the statute should take its beginning language
from versions four and five of the bill to impose the location
limitation,1'8 and it should take from the currently enacted statute the
language imposing the limitation based on the patient's emergency
medical condition, as well as the language providing for the
heightened evidentiary standard. 19 Thus, this Recent Development
115. See, e.g., Feb. 24 Minutes, supra note 23; Feb. 22 Minutes, supra note 23; Feb. 17
Minutes, supra note 23; discussion supra Part L.A. Furthermore, there are examples of
state legislatures explicitly extending such protection in the context of obstetrics. Texas,
for example, intended to include certain claims arising out of emergency situations in
obstetrics suites, rather than only in emergency rooms, and thus explicitly provided for this
in its emergency care statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153 (West
2011) ("In a suit involving a health care liability claim against a physician or health care
provider for injury to or death of a patient arising out of the provision of emergency
medical care in a hospital emergency department or obstetrical unit or in a surgical suite
immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency
department, the claimant bringing the suit may prove that the treatment or lack of
treatment by the physician or health care provider departed from accepted standards of
medical care or health care only if the claimant shows by a preponderance of the evidence
that the physician or health care provider, with willful and wanton negligence, deviated
from the degree of care and skill that is reasonably expected of an ordinarily prudent
physician or health care provider in the same or similar circumstances.").
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12(b) (2011); see also Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B) (2006) (defining "emergency medical
condition").
117. See discussion supra Part I.A.
118. S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 20, 2011); S.B. 33, 2011
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Apr. 19,2011).
119. See § 90-21.12(b). One issue that remains unclear is whether the General
Assembly intended to have the protection apply only to emergency room doctors who are
740 [Vol. 91
2013] SENATE BILL 33 741
suggests the statute should be amended to read:
In any medical malpractice action arising out of the furnishing
or the failure to furnish professional services in a hospital
emergency room'20 [for] an emergency medical condition, as the
term "emergency medical condition" is defined in 42 U.S.C.
1395dd(e)(1) [EMTALA], the claimant must prove a violation
of the standards of practice set forth in subsection (a) of this
section by clear and convincing evidence. 12 1
Altering the language as suggested here will address the concerns
posed above by this Recent Development. First, by tying the
protection to treatment "in a hospital emergency room," patients
being treated for emergencies in non-hospital treatment facilities (or
hospitals without emergency rooms) will no longer face the burden of
proving their claims by clear and convincing evidence. Since health
care providers in North Carolina are already protected by the "same
or similar community" standard encompassed in its medical
forced to treat under federal law because their hospital is covered by EMTALA's
obligations, or whether it intended for the protection to apply to all hospital emergency
room providers, regardless of whether or not the hospital was under EMTALA's
regulations. However, this distinction is statistically insignificant, as approximately ninety-
eight percent of hospitals in the United States participate in Medicare federal funding
programs, and thus are participating hospitals governed by EMTALA. See JACK JALLO &
CHRISTOPHER M. LoFrus, NEUROTRAUMA AND CRITICAL CARE OF THE BRAIN 437
(2009); see also Medero Diaz v. Grupo De Empresas De Salud, 112 F. Supp. 2d 222, 225
(D.P.R. 2000) ("A participating hospital is one that has executed a Medicare provider
agreement with the federal government." (citations omitted)). Therefore, in practical
terms, whether the statute extends protection only to providers working in emergency
departments who have a duty to treat under EMTALA, or whether it extends the
protection to all hospital emergency room providers treating emergency conditions, will
not have a large effect on the number of plaintiffs subject to the heightened evidentiary
standard. However, a conscious choice between the two would speak to the policy
rationale behind this piece of the reform. It would testify as to whether the purpose is to
protect emergency care providers due to the high-stress environment of hospital
emergency rooms, or whether it is to protect doctors when federal law strips them of their
ability to choose whether to treat a patient or not. Thus, legislators should consider this
distinction if and when they decide to amend the statute's language. If they choose to only
extend the protection to treatment required by EMTALA, then they should draw the
beginning part of the provision from versions two and three rather than versions four and
five. In this case, the statute should read, "In any medical malpractice action arising out of
the furnishing or the failure to furnish services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42
U.S.C. § 395dd, for an emergency medical condition as defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(e)(1)," S.B. 33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Mar. 2, 2011); S.B.
33, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C. Mar. 1, 2011), "the claimant must prove a
violation of the standards of practice set forth in subsection (a) of this section by clear and
convincing evidence," § 90-21.12(b).
120. N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 20, 2011); N.C. S.B. 33 (Draft, Apr. 19, 2011).
121, § 90-21.12(b).
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malpractice statute,'12 2 non-emergency health care providers-who do
not have to work in the stressful emergency room work environment
day in and day out-need no further protection from liability through
a heightened evidentiary standard. Such non-emergency providers are
already only held to the standard of other providers in their similar
community with similar training if and when they treat emergencies,
not to the standard of a trained emergency room provider.123 Thus,
reincorporating the location limitation will do away with this
unnecessary extra burden for injured plaintiffs.
Second, reincorporating the location limitation will provide
clarity in the area of Good Samaritan and volunteer EMS treatment
of emergency conditions. North Carolina has already granted Good
Samaritans and volunteer emergency providers protection from
liability by raising the mens rea requirement from negligence to gross
negligence for these individuals. 12 4 Thus, imposing upon injured
plaintiffs the additional burden of proving gross negligence by clear
and convincing evidence, rather than the typical preponderance of the
evidence standard, would render recovery an even more difficult task.
Those providing voluntary treatment to injured persons certainly
deserve some level of protection from liability, but granting both a
heightened mens rea, as well as a heightened evidentiary standard-
as the current language of the statute does-would seem to push the
balance too far in favor of health care providers at the expense of
injured plaintiffs. Reincorporating the location limitation strikes an
appropriate balance by allowing volunteer emergency providers and
Good Samaritans to keep their already granted statutory protection,
while not placing an additional hardship on injured plaintiffs through
a heightened evidentiary standard.
Lastly, reincorporating the location limitation will ensure that
the heightened protection does not extend to claims arising out of
normal childbirth. Rather, the protection will only extend to claims
arising out of emergency childbirth cases treated in hospital
emergency rooms, not obstetrics suites. Some may argue that the
extension of the heightened protection to normal childbirth claims
outside of the emergency room is actually desirable because it would
protect obstetricians who also work in high-stress environments like
122. See id. § 90-21.12(a).
123. See id.
124. See id. §§ 20-166, 90-21.14(a).
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emergency room providers. 125 However, this Recent Development
does not attempt to address the policy concerns as to whether such an
extension would be a valuable addition to North Carolina malpractice
law. Rather, this Recent Development sets forth the proposition that
the current statute is unclear, could lead to disparate treatment of
childbirth claims, and needs to be clarified. By reincorporating the
location limitation, the current statute will clearly only apply to
treatment in hospital emergency rooms. If the General Assembly
decides such protection should be extended to health care providers
rendering treatment in normal childbirth situations occurring in
obstetrics suites, this would be best addressed in a separate statute
dealing solely with heightened protection for obstetric providers and
should be done explicitly rather than in such a round-about fashion as
in the current statute.
CONCLUSION
This Recent Development argues that the General Assembly
inadvertently or unwisely extended the heightened burden of
persuasion to a much larger number of plaintiffs than solely those
treated in hospital emergency rooms. Currently in North Carolina,
any plaintiff who is unfortunate enough to suffer from an "emergency
medical condition" and then faces the further misfortune of falling
victim to medical malpractice during the treatment of that condition
will face added difficulty in proving his claim, regardless of whether
the treatment was in a hospital emergency room or not. First, the new
statute extends the heightened protection to providers working in
non-hospital treatment facilities, such as local doctors' offices, as well
as to hospitals that have no emergency department. Second, it
bestows a double layer of protection upon Good Samaritan health
care providers who happen onto the scene of a car accident, as well as
to all other volunteer emergency service providers, since these
providers already have total immunity from regular negligence claims
under North Carolina law. Last, but not least, the statute may have
serious unintended consequences for the field of obstetrics
malpractice. Now, anytime a woman in active labor is close to
delivery, she may be subject to the heightened evidentiary standard
by virtue of the legislators' deferral to EMTALA's definition of
"emergency medical condition" without the limitation that the
125. For example, the Texas legislature made the decision to extend heightened
protection from liability to at least some providers faced with malpractice claims arising in
obstetrics suites. See supra note 115.
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treatment was furnished in a hospital emergency room. These
potential consequences of the new statute not only go against policy
concerns for the victims of medical malpractice and their ability to
recover, but they also arguably lay outside the scope of the General
Assembly's intent (at least as it was depicted to the public)-to
protect hospital emergency room providers from unwarranted
liability.
This Recent Development urges the General Assembly to make
the necessary and simple revision to reincorporate the limitation on
the heightened protection based on a patient's location in a hospital
emergency room. Although it is unclear how courts may interpret this
statute in the future, it is clear that the statute's plain language
currently applies to many plaintiffs outside of those being treated in
hospital emergency rooms. Furthermore, although this Recent
Development suggests that the General Assembly may have intended
only to protect emergency room providers, the legislative history is
not so crystal clear as to definitively ensure that a court interpreting
the statute in light of its history would not also apply the protection to
all of these other providers. Therefore, the General Assembly needs
to take action to explicitly narrow the terms of the protection to
emergency room providers to avoid the serious unintended
consequences that may otherwise result.
ELIZABETH HILL"
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